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Marine protected areas (mpa s) are an important tool for protecting marine ecosystems 
both within and beyond national jurisdiction, but the integrated management of mpa s 
is challenging due to the institutional fragmentation that exists in international ocean 
governance at global and regional levels. In the absence of fundamental reform of 
international ocean governance, integrated management of mpa s can at present only 
be achieved through cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination between relevant 
international institutions. Understanding regime interaction in this context requires 
an analysis of both the relevant legal framework and the manner in which coordina-
tion mechanisms operate in practice. This article carries out a case study of regime 
interaction between the Antarctic Treaty and the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, as well as other relevant institutions, in order to 
identify the key opportunities and challenges for promoting the integrated manage-
ment of regional mpa networks in practice. It will also consider how the cooperative 
arrangements for the regional management of the Southern Ocean may provide les-
sons for the development of a new legally binding instrument for the conservation and 
management of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Keywords
Antarctic Treaty – ccamlr – regional ocean governance – marine protected areas – 
cross-sectoral coordination – integrated marine management
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1 Introduction*
The need for integration in oceans management is implicitly recognised in the 
preamble to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which 
famously proclaims that “the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated 
and need to be considered as a whole.” More explicit acknowledgement of this 
objective is found in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly which 
call for “an integrated, interdisciplinary and intersectoral approach [and] the 
need to improve cooperation and coordination at the national, regional and 
global levels, in accordance with the Convention, to support and supplement 
the efforts of each State in promoting the implementation and observance of the 
Convention and the integrated management and sustainable development 
of the oceans and seas.”1 The importance of taking an integrated approach 
to oceans management was also stressed in the First Integrated Global Oceans 
Assessment in 2015, which concluded that “the sustainable use of the 
oceans cannot be achieved unless the management of all sectors of human 
activities affecting the ocean is coherent.”2
Integrated oceans management is particularly important when consider-
ing the designation and management of marine protected areas (mpa s). mpa s 
have become a key tool in promoting marine environmental protection3 and 
they are part of a trend away from “traditional silo-structured management 
focussing on single species or sector”4 towards “an integrated approach to man-
agement that considers the entire ecosystem, including humans.”5 The devel-
opment of coherent and representative networks of mpa s has been embraced 
* This article was first presented at the Fifth International Conference on the Law of the Sea 
held in Seoul, Korea on 3 to 4 December 2020 and its publication has been supported by the 
Korean Society of International Law.
1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 75/239 (31 December 2020) preamble.
2 Summary of the first global integrated marine assessment, UN Document A/70/112 (2015), 
at para. 40, which continues: “this requires taking into account the effects on ecosystems 
of each of the many pressures, what is being done in other sectors and the way that they 
interact.” This message was reiterated by the Second Global Oceans Assessment April; United 
Nations, The Second World Oceans Assessment, Volume i (April 2021), at 5.
3 See e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity cop Decision x/2 (2010), Annex, Target 11; 
Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (25 September 2015) Goal 14.2.
4 R. D. Long, et al, Key Principles of Marine Ecosystem-Based Management, 57 Marine Policy 
53–60 (2015), at 53.
5 Ibid., at 54, citing the definition of the Communications Partnership for Science and the Sea. 
See also Convention on Biological Diversity cop Decision v/6 (2000).
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as a key objective of regional oceans governance6 as part of broader efforts 
to “develop integrated, ecosystem-based regional ocean policies and strategies 
for sustainable use of marine and coastal resources, paying close attention to 
blue growth.”7 To be effective, mpa s must address all threats by all relevant 
actors to the marine features that are protected.
Despite widespread support for this objective, achieving the effective and 
integrated management of mpa networks is a significant challenge in an inter-
national governance framework which is characterised by institutional frag-
mentation, particularly in areas beyond national jurisdiction.8 Issues are often 
regulated on a sectoral basis; different institutions deal with fisheries, ship-
ping, waste disposal, species protection, etc. This sectoral approach is designed 
to ensure the involvement of appropriate “expertise in a particular area, which 
can be important when dealing with technical issues.”9 Moreover, specialisa-
tion in this context “accommodates various needs and concerns of the states 
engaged in international law-making”10 and to some extent regime fragmenta-
tion at the international level reflects the allocation of competences between 
national government departments.11 At the same time, specialisation has its 
drawbacks. Firstly, only states which are party to the relevant sectoral treaty 
will be bound to comply, meaning that the parties may have to reach out to a 
range of other actors in order to ensure the effectiveness of any specialist mea-
sures they adopt. Secondly, the fact that there is no hierarchy between different 
6  E.g., ospar Recommendation 2003/3 on a network of marine protected areas; helcom 
Recommendation 35/1 (2014); 1995 Protocol concerning specially protected areas and bio-
logical diversity in the Mediterranean; 1990 Protocol concerning specially protected areas 
and wildlife in the wider Caribbean region;1985 Protocol concerning protected areas and 
wild fauna and flora in the Eastern African region; 1989 Protocol for the conservation and 
management of protected marine and coastal areas of the South-East Pacific.
7  United Nations Environment Programme, Regional Seas Strategic Directions (2017–2020) 
(Regional Seas Reports and Studies No 201, 2015), at 2.
8  See N. Oral, ‘The Institutional Schizophrenia of Ocean Governance through the lens of the 
conservation of biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction’, in S. Trevisanut, 
et al (Eds.), Regime Interaction in Oceans Governance: Problems, Theories and Methods, 
52–84 (Brill, Leiden, 2020).
9  J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 
at 237.
10  G. Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 849–863 (2004), at 858.
11  E. Hey, ‘Regime Interaction and Common Interests in Regulating Human Activities in 
Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ in S. Trevisanut, et al (Eds.), Regime Interaction in 
Oceans Governance: Problems, theories and methods, 85–123 (Brill, Leiden, 2020), at 101; 
R. Billé, et al, Regional Oceans Governance: Making Regional Seas Programmes, Regional 
Fishery Bodies and Large Marine Ecosystems Mechanisms Work Better Together (unep 
Regional Seas Reports and Studies No 197, 2016), at 110.
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sectoral institutions – with each international body operating autonomously 
subject to its own mandate, membership and powers – raises the possibility of 
incoherence, or worse still incompatibility, between the resulting regulations. 
Even when treaty bodies have compatible functional aims, tensions can still 
arise due to “the different approaches that these regimes take to framing the 
what, that is in determining the how and the who” of international regulation.12
In the absence of fundamental reform of international ocean governance, 
integrated management of mpa s can at present only be achieved through 
cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination between relevant international 
institutions. One way of framing such activities is as a question of “regime 
interaction” which can be understood as “the situation where rules, institutions 
and the operation of one legal regime is affected by another legal regime.”13 It 
is important to appreciate that analysing regime interaction is not simply a 
matter of studying the formal legal relationship between distinct sets of legal 
instruments, but rather it requires an evaluation of the ongoing engagement 
between institutions in order to understand what opportunities and chal-
lenges arise in the application of the legal tools that are available.
With this in mind, this article explores the development of integrated 
regional networks of mpa s through a case study of regime interaction in the 
Southern Ocean. In many ways, this region is unique, not only because of its 
complex and fragile ecosystems, but also because of the sui generis political 
and legal arrangements to oversee international cooperation in this region.14 
The Antarctic Treaty System is composed of a number of related, but inde-
pendent, treaties and associated instruments15, which provide the basis for 
regulating human activities on the Antarctic continent and the surrounding 
marine environment. Because of the fragility of the Antarctic environment and 
the unique assemblage of species and habitats which are found there, states 
12  Hey, supra note 11, at 87.
13  See S. Trevisanut, et al, ‘Regime Interaction in Ocean Governance’, in S. Trevisanut et al 
(Eds.), Regime Interaction in Oceans Governance: Problems, Theories and Methods, 1–21 
(Brill 2020), at 4.
14  See generally A. Schram Stokke and D. Vidas (Eds.), Governing the Antarctic: The Effec-
tiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1996); F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (Eds.), International Law for Antarctica (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 1996); G. Triggs and A. Riddell (Eds.), Antarctica: Legal and 
Environmental Challenges for the Future (British Institute of International and Compara-
tive Law, London, 2007).
15  See 1991 Environment Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (Protocol), Article 1(e) which 
defines the Antarctic Treaty System as “the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under 
that Treaty, its associated separate international instruments in force and measures in 
effect under those instruments.”
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involved in the region have underlined the importance of taking environmen-
tal protection measures in order to safeguard one of the last great wildernesses 
on the planet. As a result, the regional institutions responsible for regulating 
activities in the Southern Ocean have often adopted innovative conservation 
measures. Despite significant convergence over common values in the region, 
cooperation is not always straightforward.16 Indeed, recent years have seen a 
rise in tensions within the regional institutions, with disagreement over the 
precise objectives to be pursued and the manner of their implementation. This 
has been particularly the case in relation to the designation and management 
of mpa s, as discussed below. At the same time, the stakes of cooperation are 
increasing, with climate change posing a particularly significant threat to the 
region due to the retreat or collapse of ice shelves, accompanied by increasing 
sea levels and water temperatures17, all of which have an impact on marine 
and terrestrial life.18
In light of these challenges, the purpose of this article is to consider the gov-
ernance arrangements for marine environmental protection in the Antarctic 
region, analysing the normative and institutional frameworks for the devel-
opment of mpa s in the Southern Ocean and how these institutions interact 
in practice. It will consider the procedures developed under the Antarctic 
Treaty, the Protocol on Environmental Protection and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (ccamlr) for the desig-
nation and management of mpa s, as well as how the institutions established 
under these different instruments interact in order to pursue integrated 
oceans management in the Southern Ocean. It will then go on to consider the 
broader challenges of ensuring cooperation between regional institutions and 
other relevant international organisations whose mandate includes the regula-
tion of activities within the Southern Ocean, with a focus on the International 
Maritime Organisation as the global body responsible for regulating shipping. 
Finally, in conclusion, the article will consider how the cooperative arrange-
ments for the regional management of the Southern Ocean may provide lessons 
16  L. Cordonnery, et al, Nexus and Imbroglio: CCAMLR, the Madrid Protocol and Designating 
Antarctic Marine Protected Areas in the Southern Ocean, 30 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 727–764 (2015), at 760.
17  See generally Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, Antarctic Climate Change and 
the Environment (2009); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on 
Oceans and the Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (2019).
18  The precise impacts are however difficult to predict and some species may in fact benefit 
from climate change; see Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, Antarctic Climate 
Change and the Environment – 2019 Update (2019), at 6.
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for the development of a new legally binding instrument for the conservation 
and management of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
2 Regional Ocean Governance in the Southern Ocean
2.1 The Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol on Environmental Protection
Regional cooperation in relation to Antarctica is primarily based upon the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty, which was designed to curtail territorial disputes relat-
ing to the continent and its resources. The basic principle of the Treaty is that 
“Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only” and the treaty goes on 
to suspend any claims to sovereignty over Antarctica whilst the treaty is in 
force.19 The Treaty applies to “the area south of 60o South Latitude, includ-
ing all ice shelves”, which means that it covers large portions of the Southern 
Ocean. Yet, as a result of the suspension of claims, there are no coastal states 
in the traditional sense of that term; rather states cooperate based upon their 
overall interests in the region. Today, there are 54 parties to the Treaty, which 
includes the original 12 countries who participated in the negotiations (namely 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa, Russia, the UK, and the USA) and a larger number of states who 
have since acceded to the instrument.
The primary body established under the Antarctic Treaty is the Consultative 
Meeting (atcm)20 which has the power to develop specific measures to fur-
ther the objectives of the Treaty.21 Unlike many international treaties, not all 
parties to the Antarctic Treaty are permitted to fully participate in the atcm. 
Rather, the atcm is open to the contracting parties who were original signa-
tory states to the Antarctic Treaty and other acceding contracting parties “dur-
ing such times as that contracting party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica 
by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the estab-
lishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition.”22 
Currently there are 29 Consultative Parties.23 The other parties are invited to 
attend meetings of the atcm, but they cannot participate in decision-making. 
19  Antarctic Treaty, Article iv.
20  Since 1994, meetings of the atcm have taken place on an annual basis.
21  Antarctic Treaty, Articles ix(1) and (4).
22  Antarctic Treaty, Article ix(2). Since 1983, such states have been permitted to attend as 
observers.
23  Venezuela applied for consultative status in 2018, but it was rejected; atcm xli Report 
(2018), at para. 34.
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One criticism of this system is that “those States who can pay for themselves 
are eligible but those who are poor will never have a chance”24, but it has been 
defended by the assertion that “it makes sense that States that have a special 
knowledge and interest have the prime responsibility to govern the continent” 
and “it is not possible to disregard the claims aspect … and this is a fact that 
is recognised by the Treaty itself.”25 Nevertheless, the exclusive nature of the 
regime sits uneasily with the recognition in the preamble of the Treaty that “it 
is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes” and in the past it has led to some states claiming that the 
Consultative Parties were abusing their dominant position to the detriment 
of the international community.26 These criticisms underline the underly-
ing political character of treaty regimes and the role they play in determining 
which states have a voice in decision-making.27
The atcm operates by unanimity28, which means that decision-making can 
be slow and any single participant can effectively veto the adoption of mea-
sures, decisions and resolutions.29 Moreover, the entry into force of measures 
requires the approval of all Consultative Parties30, which reiterates the consen-
sual nature of the regime.
Although the atcm is not recognised by unep as a relevant regional seas 
body31, the atcm clearly has a mandate to adopt measures for environmental 
24  M. Jacobsson, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System: Future Challenges’, in G. Triggs and A. Riddell 
(Eds.), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the Future, 1–16 (British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, London, 2007), at 15.
25  Ibid., at 16.
26  See discussion in D. Vidas, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: 
An Overview’, in O. Schram Stokke and D. Vidas (Eds.), Governing the Antarctic: The effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, 35–60 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), at 49–58.
27  See Hey, supra note 11, at 103–104.
28  atcm Rules of Procedure, Rule 24: “Measures, Decisions and Resolutions, as referred to 
in Decision 1 (1995), shall be adopted by the Representatives of all Consultative Parties 
present.”
29  See K. Bastmeijer, Introduction: The Madrid Protocol 1998–2008: The Need to Address the 
Success Syndrome, 8 Polar Journal 230–240 (2018), at 237.
30  Antarctic Treaty, Article ix(4).
31  On its website explaining the regional seas programme, unep identifies ccamlr as 
a relevant body for the protection of the marine environment in the Antarctic region; 
see https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/oceans-seas/what-we-do/working 
-regional-seas/regional-seas-programmes/antarctic. Yet, as noted by Molenaar, in prac-
tice the competence of ccamlr is far more limited compared to many regional seas 
bodies; E. J. Molenaar, ‘Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’, in 
R. Caddell and E. J. Molenaar (Eds.), Strengthening International Fisheries Law in an Era of 
Changing Oceans, 103–130 (Hart, Oxford, 2019), at 107.
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protection, including the protection of the marine environment. In this regard, 
the Treaty expressly recognises that the atcm may adopt measures relating 
to the “preservation and conservation of living resources in the Antarctic.”32 
The competence of the atcm over both land and sea means that the atcm 
is arguably well-positioned to adopt an ecosystems approach to management 
of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean by addressing all relevant threats. Indeed, 
the imperative of protecting the environment of the Antarctic continent and 
surrounding seas became an early priority of the atcm. At the third meeting 
of the atcm in 1964, states adopted Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora, which both regulated the taking of native mammals 
and birds in Antarctica, as well as designating areas of outstanding scientific 
interest as Specially Protected Areas “in order to preserve their unique natural 
ecological system.”33 Other measures were soon adopted which developed the 
legal framework for the protection of the marine environment in the Antarctic, 
albeit in a sporadic fashion.34 As a result, the Treaty must be understood in light 
of this broader body of resolutions, decisions and measures, many of which are 
treated as legally binding if subsequently approved by all relevant parties.35
One of the most important developments under the Antarctic Treaty is the 
adoption of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection which is designed 
to provide a “comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems …”36 The Protocol 
expressly recognises “the intrinsic value of Antarctica”37 and it purports to 
“designate Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science.”38 
This designation does not prohibit activities in Antarctica in general, but 
rather calls for management of all activities in order to “limit adverse impacts 
on the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.”39 
The Protocol introduces a number of important rules relating to the protec-
tion of the environment, with annexes on environmental impact assessment; 
the conservation of Antarctic flora and fauna; waste disposal and waste man-
agement; prevention of marine pollution, including pollution from vessels; 
32  Antarctic Treaty, Article ix(1)(f).
33  1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Article 1.
34  See also the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, which is considered 
part of the Antarctic Treaty System.
35  Resolutions are hortatory whereas measures (directed at states) and decisions (concern-
ing the internal organisation of the atcm) are legally binding; see atcm Decision 1 (1995).
36  Protocol, preamble.
37  Protocol, Article 3(1).
38  Protocol, Article 2. In doing so, Article 7 of the Protocol introduces a prohibition on ‘any 
activity relating to mineral resources.’
39  Protocol, Article 3(2)(a).
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area protection and management40; and liability.41 The explicit inclusion of 
rules relating to the prevention of marine pollution reinforces the mandate 
of the Antarctic Treaty over marine environmental protection in the region 
and the Protocol makes clear that “activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area shall 
be planned and conducted so as to avoid … significant changes in [inter alia] 
marine environments.”42
The Protocol also establishes a new body – the Committee on Environmental 
Protection (cep) – to advise on, inter alia, the state of the Antarctic environ-
ment, the need to update, strengthen or improve measures for the protection of 
the environment and the means of minimising and mitigating environmental 
impacts of activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.43 All parties to the Protocol 
are members of cep44 whether or not they are a Consultative Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty. However, it is the atcm which remains the primary decision-
maker under the Protocol and it is tasked with “defining the general policy for 
the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent 
and associated ecosystems” and adopting further measures for the implemen-
tation of the Protocol in accordance with Article 9 of the Antarctic Treaty.45 
It follows that the Protocol does not radically alter the dynamics of the gover-
nance regime under the Antarctic Treaty or the dominance of the Consultative 
Parties in determining the progressive development of the regime.
Protected areas are one of the tools at the disposal of the atcm and the pow-
ers to establish Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (aspa) in order “to protect 
outstanding environmental scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness values 
… or ongoing or planned scientific research”46 expressly apply to “any marine 
area.”47 The designation process is commenced by a party submitting a pro-
posed management plan to the atcm48, although as discussed in the following 
section, further procedural obligations may apply in relation to proposals for 
marine aspa s. To date, six wholly marine aspa s have been adopted – Chile Bay 
(aspa 144); Port Foster (aspa 145); Western Bransfield Strait (aspa 152); Eastern 
Dallman Bay (aspa 153); Terra Nova Bay (aspa 161) – along with a further 14 
40  This Annex was adopted by way of Recommendation xvi-10 (1991). The Annex entered 
into force in 1998 following acceptance by all Consultative Parties.
41  This Annex was adopted by way of Measure 1(2005), but it has not yet entered into force.
42  Protocol, Article 3(2)(b)(iii).
43  Protocol, Article 12.
44  Protocol, Article 11(2).
45  Protocol, Article 10(1).
46  Protocol, Annex v, Article 3(1).
47  Protocol, Annex v, Article 2.
48  Protocol, Annex v, Article 5(1). Detailed information concerning the contents of the 
Management Plan are indicated in Article 5(3).
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aspa s which have a marine component to them.49 Once designated, “entry 
into aspa s shall be prohibited except in accordance with a permit…”50 This 
establishes a high-level of protection as the issuance of permits may only be 
issued in accordance with the agreed management plans for the aspa.51
Another form of protected area that may be established by the atcm is an 
Antarctic Specially Managed Area (asma) which is an area requiring states 
to cooperate in order to minimise environmental impacts.52 In general, entry 
into asma s does not require a permit, although asma s may overlap with 
aspa s.53 Activities in an amsa must be managed according to an agreed man-
agement plan, which may include the regulation of cumulative environmen-
tal impacts.54 In practice, a number of asma s have a marine component to 
them55, although it has been noted in general that the use of aspa s and asma s 
to date only protects small, coastal areas that make “little contribution to the 
development of a representative system of mpa s.”56 Nevertheless, the gen-
eral mandate of the atcm under the Protocol suggests that it is competent to 
address all aspects of marine environmental protection and it could in theory 
pursue an integrated approach to the management of mpa s in the Southern 
Ocean, should it choose to make greater use of its powers. At the same time, its 
ability to do so is affected by a number of considerations.
Firstly, it is significant that the Protocol is an independent treaty and there-
fore it is only binding on those states who become a party. The entry into force 
conditions of the Protocol required all Consultative Parties to ratify, accept or 
accede to the treaty in order to ensure that these key actors were all bound by 
its provisions57, but it does not follow that all parties to the Antarctic Treaty are 
also parties to the Protocol. Early on, the atcm called upon non-consultative 
49  Indeed, there are several of these aspa s which have a significant marine component, 
e.g. Cape Washington and Silverfish Bay (97.67% marine); South Bay (97.18% marine); 
Emperor Island (96.18% marine).
50  Protocol, Annex v, Article 3(4).
51  Protocol, Annex v, Article 7(1).
52  Protocol, Annex v, Article 4.
53  Protocol, Annex v, Article 4(3)–(4).
54  Protocol, Annex v, Article 4(2)(a).
55  See discussion below.
56  Report of the ccamlr Workshop on Marine Protected Areas (2005), at para. 44. See also 
The Netherlands, The Role of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Protecting the 
Marine Environment through Marine Spatial Protection, atcm Document ip 49 (2014); 
K. N. Scott, ‘Marine Protected Areas in the Southern Ocean’, in E. J. Molenaar, et al (Eds.), 
Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions: Interactions between global and regional regimes, 
113–137 (Brill, Leiden, 2013), at 131.
57  Protocol, Article 23(1).
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parties to the Antarctic Treaty to become a party to the Protocol as soon as 
possible, in particular to avoid adverse impacts of tourist activities on the con-
tinent and its surrounding seas.58 However, at the time of writing, there are 
still a number of parties to the Antarctic Treaty which have not become a party 
to the Protocol, demonstrating the limits of such pleas and the partial nature 
of the legal regime in place.
Nor is this a problem that is limited to the interaction of the Treaty and 
the Protocol. More generally, the Treaty also makes clear that “nothing in the 
present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise 
of rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas 
within that area”59, meaning that it does not completely displace the tradi-
tional framework of the law of the sea.60 This is particularly significant as it 
means that the rights of non-parties to exercise their high seas freedoms in the 
Southern Ocean remain, in spite of the environmental measures developed 
under the Antarctic Treaty. This means that the parties to the Antarctic Treaty 
may need to reach out to third states if they are to effectively manage activities 
in the Southern Ocean in an integrated manner. This is recognised in the Treaty 
itself which provides that “each of the contracting parties undertakes to exert 
appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the 
end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles 
and purposes of the present Treaty.”61 Like its parent treaty, the Protocol also 
calls upon parties to encourage other states to refrain from undermining the 
measures adopted under the Protocol and it provides that “the [atcm] shall 
draw the attention of any State which is not a party to this Protocol to any 
activity undertaken by that State, its agencies, instrumentalities, natural or 
juridical persons, ships, aircraft, or other means of transport which affects the 
implementation of the objectives and principles of this Protocol.”62 It follows 
that the effectiveness of the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol to achieve their 
marine environmental objectives will depend not only upon the measures that 
are adopted by the parties, but also on engagement with non-parties, either 
58  Resolution 6 (1999).
59  Antarctic Treaty, Article vi.
60  There are important questions that arise concerning the extent of high seas in the 
Southern Ocean, given the contested claims to territory in the Antarctic – these issues 
go beyond the scope of this paper, but they have been addressed extensively in the litera-
ture. See e.g. D. Vidas, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System and the law of the sea: a new dimen-
sion introduced by the Protocol’ in O. Schram Stokke and D. Vidas (Eds.), Governing the 
Antarctic: The effectiveness and legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, 61–90 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996).
61  Antarctic Treaty, Article x.
62  Protocol, Article xiii(5).
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directly or through other relevant international organisations. In this respect, 
it is important to recognise that the atcm is not the only regional body with an 
interest in developing mpa s in the Southern Ocean.
2.2 The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources
Another key instrument in the region is ccamlr, which establishes a spe-
cific institutional framework for the management of marine living resources 
in the Southern Ocean. ccamlr was spurred by a growing interest in devel-
oping a krill fishery in the Southern Ocean and the recognition of the need 
for careful management of such an enterprise.63 ccamlr was negotiated by 
the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty with additional participation 
of the (then) two Germanies who were already engaged in or planning krill 
fisheries.64 However, ccamlr is open to participation by “any State interested 
in research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine living resources to 
which [the] Convention applies”65 and it currently has 36 parties. 
Whilst ccamlr was principally designed to regulate fishing within the 
Southern Ocean, it does expressly recognise the need to “provide for the effec-
tive conservation of the marine living resources of the Antarctic ecosys-
tem as a whole.”66 This goal is reflected in the treaty in a number of ways.67 
Firstly, ccamlr extends beyond the area south of 60o South latitude and 
also encompa sses Antarctic marine living resources found “between that lati-
tude and the Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem.”68 Secondly, the objectives of ccamlr are defined in terms of not 
63  Prior to the conclusion of ccamlr, the atcm adopted interim measures in Recommen-
dation ix-2 (1977). For background, see D. L. Alverson, Tug-of-War for the Antarctic Krill, 8 
Ocean Development and International Law 171–182 (1980).
64  See Molenaar, supra note 31. Requests from other states (namely South Korea and the 
Netherlands) to join the negotiations were rejected.
65  ccamlr, Article 29. This provision goes on to provide that it is open to regional economic 
integration organisations which include one or more states members of the Commission, 
which has permitted participation of the EU in the work of the Commission.
66  atcm Recommendation ix-2 (1977), para.iii(3)(c).
67  See generally C. Redgwell, ‘Protection of Ecosystems under International Law: Lessons 
from Antarctica’, in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (Eds.), International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, 205–224 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999).
68  ccamlr, Article 1. The Antarctic Convergence is defined in Article 1(4). In accordance 
with a statement contained in the Final Act to the Conference, the Convention will only 
apply to areas within the national jurisdiction of parties with the consent of those par-
ties. This is particularly relevant to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands which are under the 
sovereignty of France. 
Downloaded from Brill.com12/13/2021 11:31:08AM
via University of Edinburgh
224 Harrison
Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 (2021) 212–242
only preventing the decrease of harvested populations to levels below those 
which ensure their stable recruitment, but also to maintain “ecological rela-
tionships between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic 
marine living resources” and the “prevention of changes or minimization of the 
risks of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible 
over two or three decades.”69 This emphasis on ecosystems distinguished the 
Convention from many other regional fisheries treaties in place at the time.70
A Commission is established to facilitate research into Antarctic marine 
ecosystems and to adopt binding conservation measures to achieve the objec-
tives of the Convention.71 ccamlr mirrors the approach taken in the Antarctic 
Treaty by providing that membership of the Commission is limited to those 
original states who participated in the conclusion of the Convention and any 
party which “is engaged in research or harvesting activities” at a particular 
point in time. Currently, of the 36 parties to the Convention, only 26 of them 
are members of the Commission.72 Moreover, the Commission also operates 
by consensus73 and whilst conservation measures become binding 180 days 
after their adoption, an individual Member may nevertheless object to a mea-
sure within 90 days in order to prevent the application of a measure to it.74
The Commission has adopted a large number of decisions which give effect 
to an ecosystem approach, including in relation to the protection of associ-
ated species and habitats, such as sea birds75, and so-called vulnerable marine 
ecosystems.76 Moreover, the Commission has also used its powers under the 
Convention for the “designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions 
or sub-regions for the purposes of scientific study or conservation, including 
69  ccamlr, Article 2.
70  See particularly discussion Redgwell, supra note 69, at 214. The First Performance Review 
of ccamlr, however, concluded that ‘the distinction between ccamlr and rfmos has 
lessened in recent years’; CCAMLR Performance Review Panel Report (1 September 2008) 
para. 22.
71  ccamlr, Article 9. There is a debate over the precise status of ccamlr and whether it 
can be considered a regional fisheries management organisation, a regional seas body, or 
a sui generis body; see e.g. Molenaar, supra note 31, at 107.
72  See https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/who-involved-ccamlr.
73  ccamlr, Article 12.
74  ccamlr, Article 9(6).
75  E.g. ccamlr Conservation Measure 25-02 (2018); ccamlr Conservation Measure 25-03 
(2019).
76  E.g. ccamlr Conservation Measure 22-06(2019); ccamlr Conservation Measure 22-09 
(2012).
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special areas for protection and scientific study”77 to develop a number of dif-
ferent types of area-based management tools.
Firstly, the Commission has identified a number of sites as part of its 
ccamlr Ecosystem Monitoring Programme (cemp) which may be managed 
according to a management plan adopted by the Commission.78 There are cur-
rently twenty such sites in operation, mostly to monitor penguin colonies.79
Secondly, Special Areas of Scientific Study (sass) may also be proposed by 
Members in areas where ice-shelves have collapsed or are in retreat.80 Such 
sites are automatically designated for a period of up to two years following a 
proposal from a single Member State and special protection measures apply 
during that period. This provisional designation is followed by a consideration 
of more detailed information on the extent and characteristics of the sass81 
and designation may be extended for a further 10 years upon agreement of 
the Commission.82 Once designated, only research fishing in accordance with 
agreed research plans can be carried out in a sass.83
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission has also developed 
a General Framework for the Establishment of ccamlr Marine Protected 
Areas (mpa s)84 which provides for the development of a “representative sys-
tem of Antarctic Marine Protected Areas with the aim of conserving marine 
biological diversity in the Convention Area.”85 The General Framework sets 
out the overall objectives of a mpa network and it emphasises that mpa s 
should be adopted “on the basis of the best available scientific advice.”86 To 
date, ccamlr has designated two mpa s, namely the South Orkney Islands 
77  ccamlr, Article 9(2)(g).
78  See ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-01 (2004).
79  See https://www.ccamlr.org/en/science/cemp-sites.
80  ccamlr Conservation Measure 24-04 (2017). Two sites have been designated to date: an 
area adjacent to the Larson C Ice Shelf and an area adjacent to Pine Island Glacier.
81  Ibid., at paras. 4–5.
82  Ibid., at para. 10. At the 2020 Meeting of the Commission, Members failed to reach con-
sensus on the designation of Pine Island Glacier as a stage 2 sass; see ccamlr 39 Report 
(2020), at para. 8.12. The Report raises the prospect of a Member submitting a proposal for 
redesignation of a Stage 1 sass.
83  ccamlr Conservation Measure 24-04 (2017), at paras. 8, 12, 14.
84  ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-04 (2011). For background to this measure and the vari-
ous meetings and workshops on mpa designation in the Southern Ocean, see C. M. Brooks, 
Competing Values on the Antarctic High Seas: CCAMLR and the Challenge of Marine- 
Protected Areas, 3 The Polar Journal 277–300 (2013), at 280–282.
85  ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-04 (2011), preamble.
86  Ibid., at para. 2.
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Southern Shelf mpa87 and the Ross Sea mpa.88 At the time of its adoption, 
the South Orkney Islands mpa was heralded as the first high seas mpa89 
and the Ross Sea mpa was for a time the world’s largest mpa90, underlining the 
significance of the actions by the Commission in this area. Under the General 
Framework, mpa s should be accompanied by a research management plan91, 
although the Commission has struggled to achieve consensus of these docu-
ments for the two existing mpa s.92 Indeed, several other mpa proposals relat-
ing to East Antarctica, the Weddell Sea and Domain 1 of the Antarctic Peninsula 
have evaded consensus for a number of years, in large part to objections from 
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China93, although it must 
be noted that a much broader range of states have expressed concerns about 
the process for designating mpa s at different stages.94 These disagreements 
illustrate the challenges of developing effective environmental measures in a 
system which relies upon consensus.95
The relationship between the Commission and non-parties is also com-
plex. Whilst treaties do not normally bind third states96, if non-parties to 
ccamlr are parties to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, they 
will be required to refrain from authorising vessels from fishing in the ccamlr 
87  ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-03 (2009). This measure prohibits all fishing within 
the mpa, with the exception of ‘scientific fishing research activities agreed by the 
Commission.’ The measure also prohibits discharges and dumping from fishing vessels, 
as well as transhipment activities involving fishing vessels.
88  ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-05 (2016). The mpa encompa sses a General Protection 
Zone, a Special Research Zone and a Krill Research Zone, with different restrictions appli-
cable to each zone.
89  See e.g. BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY, NEWS: SOUTH ORKNEYS MARINE 
PROTECTED AREA (20 November 2009), available at https://www.bas.ac.uk/media-post/ 
south-orkneys-marine-protected-area/.
90  MATT MCGRATH, WORLD’S LARGEST MARINE PROTECTED AREA DECLARED 
IN ANTARCTICA, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-3778 
9594. It has since been surpassed, at least in terms of size, by the Marae Moana mpa 
adopted by the Cook Islands in 2017.
91  ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-04 (2011), at para. 5.
92  See e.g. discussions at ccamlr 38 Report (2019), at paras. 6.25–6.40.
93  See e.g. ibid., at paras. 6.41–6.55.
94  See Brooks, supra note 84, at 288–289. Brooks notes that “fishing interests do seem to cor-
relate with concerns; ibid., at 294.
95  Nor is this the only issue where consensus has been lacking; see e.g. the discussion on 
shark finning in ccamlr 38 Report (2019), at paras. 3.16–3.19. More broadly on factors 
influencing consensus within the Commission, see S. T. Sykora-Bodie and T. H. Morrison, 
‘Drivers of consensus-based decision-making in international environmental regimes: 
Lessons from the Southern Ocean’, 29 Aquatic Conservation 2147–2161 (2019).
96  1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34.
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area unless they agree to apply the conservation and management measures 
adopted by the Commission.97 The special status attributed to conservation 
and management measures of regional fisheries management organisations 
under the Fish Stocks Agreement promotes the comprehensive application 
of the measures adopted by these bodies, thereby increasing their effective-
ness. Yet, this obligation under the Fish Stocks Agreement only applies to the 
authorisation of fishing and it cannot ensure that other activities by a state in a 
different capacity may not undermine measures adopted by the Commission in 
pursuit of its broad environmental mandate, for example permitting the land-
ing or import of fish caught in contravention of ccamlr rules.98 To this end, 
Article 22 of ccamlr provides that “the Commission shall draw the attention 
of any State which is not a Party to this Convention to any activity undertaken 
by its nationals or vessels, which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects the 
implementation of the objective of this Convention.”99 This provision under-
lines the broader engagement that may be required by the Commission in 
order to ensure the effectiveness of its measures.
Furthermore, the mandate of the Commission is clearly much narrower 
than that of the atcm and so it cannot ensure that vulnerable marine ecosys-
tems are fully protected from all threats. To that end, it must engage in coop-
eration with other bodies in order to ensure integrated management of mpa s.
3 Intra-Regional Cooperation and Coordination within the Antarctic 
Treaty System
3.1 Cooperation and Coordination in the Mandates of Regional 
Institutions
The previous section has highlighted the main regional instruments and insti-
tutions involved in the protection of the marine environment in the Southern 
Ocean. Insofar as the mandates of these institutions overlap, regime inter-
action will be necessary in order to promote the integrated protection of 
Antarctic marine ecosystems.
The starting point for understanding the relationship between the atcm 
and the Commission is the fact that ccamlr is considered as “an integral 
97  1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 17(2). See also Article 8(4).
98  E.g. ccamlr Conservation Measure 10–03 (Port inspections of fishing vessels carrying 
Antarctic marine living resources); Conservation Measure 10–05 (Catch documentation 
scheme for Dissostichus spp.).
99  ccamlr, Article 10 (emphasis added). See e.g. ccamlr Resolution 14/xix (Catch Docu-
mentation Scheme: implementation by Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties).
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part”100 of the broader Antarctic Treaty System.101 As a result, certain interac-
tions between these two institutions have been built into the legal framework.
Firstly, ccamlr calls for an alignment of the obligations of ccamlr par-
ties with obligations under the Antarctic Treaty. Thus, ccamlr parties have 
accepted, at least in principle, to refrain from engaging in activities in the 
Antarctic treaty area contrary to the principles and purposes of the Antarctic 
Treaty.102 Indeed, ccamlr goes further and provides that parties are bound 
by the obligations in Articles 1 (requiring Antarctica to be used for peaceful 
purposes only), 4 (freezing territorial claims over Antarctica), 5 (prohibiting 
nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica), and 6 
(preserving the exercise of high seas freedoms in the Southern Ocean) of the 
Antarctic Treaty, “whether or not they are Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.”103 
These provisions ensure a certain coherency between the basic obligations of 
parties under both instruments. Even more pertinent to the present discus-
sion, Article 5(2) of ccamlr provides that “Contracting Parties which are not 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty agree that, in their activities in the Antarctic 
Treaty area, they will observe as and when appropriate the Agreed Measures 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora and such other measures as 
have been recommended by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in fulfil-
ment of their responsibility for the protection of the Antarctic environment 
from all forms of harmful human interference.” This latter obligation acts as 
a dynamic rule of reference, whereby the obligations of ccamlr parties will 
evolve as the atcm adopts new environmental measures. Yet, what is precisely 
captured by this obligation is obscure. One question that arises in this con-
text is whether ccamlr parties are required to respect obligations under the 
Environment Protocol. It is not immediately obvious that a treaty instrument 
qualifies as a “measure … recommended by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties” but there are strong arguments why it should be, in particular as the 
Protocol is inherently linked to the subsequent development of such mea-
sures.104 Indeed, Annex V of the Protocol dealing with protected areas was 
adopted as a Recommendation of the atcm105 and some of the original 
Annexes have also been amended through the adoption of atcm Measures.106 
100 CCAMLR Performance Review Panel Report (1 September 2008), at para. 1.
101 See also 2019 Prague Declaration on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the 
Antarctic Treaty, at para. 13.
102 ccamlr, Article 3.
103 ccamlr, Articles 3 and 4(1).
104 Protocol, Article 10(1)(b).
105 See atcm Recommendation xvi-10 (1991).
106 atcm Measure 16 (2009).
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As a result, at least parts of the Protocol would seem to squarely fall within the 
scope of Article 5(2) of ccamlr. This was a view shared by the First ccamlr 
Performance Review Panel which concluded that Article 5(2) “infers that ele-
ments of the Environmental Protocol, along with certain measures adopted by 
the atcm, should indeed be observed by [ccamlr parties]”107 and this inter-
pretation would certainly serve increase coordination across the two regimes. 
ccamlr also addresses ongoing institutional cooperation between 
the Commission and the atcm108 and the atcm has equally encouraged 
“increased cooperation at the practical level between the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.”109 The atcm and the Commission have not entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding which outlines the main principles 
and procedures for cooperation110 and so cooperation takes place on an ad hoc 
basis. Cooperation in this respect is largely achieved by regular exchanges of 
observers, who present information concerning the activities of each institu-
tion. Moreover, cooperation is also explicitly built into the powers of the insti-
tutions operating under both ccamlr and the Protocol.
For its part, when exercising its powers, the Commission is explicitly man-
dated to “… take full account of any relevant measures or regulations estab-
lished or recommended by the Consultative Meetings pursuant to Article ix of 
the Antarctic Treaty … in order that there will be no inconsistency between the 
rights and obligations of a Contracting Party under such regulations or mea-
sures and conservation measures which may be adopted by the Commission.”111 
This provision clearly calls for ongoing alignment of the two treaties and it 
could be interpreted as an obligation of result with the effect of prohibiting the 
Commission from adopting a measure which was incompatible with any exist-
ing measures adopted under the Antarctic Treaty. Yet, the avoidance of incon-
sistency must be understood as addressing direct conflicts between measures 
and so this provision does not necessarily demand the positive coordination of 
measures so ensure their overall coherence.
Similar requirements are laid down in the Protocol, albeit in slightly looser 
terms: “the Parties shall consult and co-operate with the Contracting Parties to 
the other international instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty sys-
tem and their respective institutions with a view to ensuring the achievement 
107 CCAMLR Performance Review Panel Report (1 September 2008), at para. 6.
108 ccamlr, Article 23(1).
109 atcm Resolution 1 (2006).
110 Such a step has been proposed, but rejected by some consultative parties as ‘too formal’; 
atcm xxxiii Report (2010), at para. 460.
111 ccamlr, Article 9(5).
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of the objectives and principles of this Protocol and avoiding any interference 
with the achievement of the objectives and principles of those instruments 
or any inconsistency between the implementation of those instruments and 
this Protocol.”112 This provision similarly focuses on preventing inconsistency. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the obligation in ccamlr, this provision of the 
Protocol would appear to be an obligation of conduct, which mandates coop-
eration, but does not dictate a particular outcome. In practice, this general 
obligation has been supplemented by more specific decisions of the atcm 
addressing alignment. For example, the atcm recommended in 2002 that 
“Parties to the Antarctic Treaty which are not Party to the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources but which neverthe-
less are involved in the harvesting and trade of toothfish, consider acceding 
to the Convention and, in the meantime, agree voluntarily to implement the 
Dissostichus Catch Documentation Scheme.”113 This decision is hortatory, 
however, and it does not create legal obligations for states.
3.2 Intra-regional Cooperation and Coordination in the Development of 
mpa Networks
The opportunities and challenges of developing coordinated and coherent 
conservation measures are clearly illustrated by the establishment and man-
agement of mpa s in the Southern Ocean. In this context, we see express recog-
nition of the need for early engagement between the atcm and Commission, 
but it is also possible to identify some of the practical challenges of coopera-
tion and coordination that arise when two independent regimes overlap. 
Let us first consider the establishment of aspa s and asma s by the atcm. 
When the target of protection is the marine environment, cooperation 
between the atcm and the Commission is explicitly built into the procedure 
for the establishment of these measures; Annex v provides that “no marine 
area shall be designated as an aspa or asma without the prior approval of 
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.”114 
Furthermore, proposed management plans for marine areas must be for-
warded to the Commission and any comments from the Commission must 
be taken into account. atcm Decision 9 (2005) clarifies that this obligation 
applies when there is actual harvesting or potential capability of harvesting 
112 Protocol, Article 5.
113 atcm Resolution 3 (2002). This Resolution was adopted following a Resolution adopted 
by ccamlr in 2000, which urged non-parties to participate in the catch documentation 
scheme: ccamlr Resolution 14/xix.
114 Protocol, Annex v, Article 6(2). A similar process had applied prior to the entry into force 
of Annex v of the Protocol; see atcm Decision 4 (1998).
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of marine living resources which might be affected by site designation, when 
there are provisions specified in a draft management plan which might pre-
vent or restrict ccamlr related activities, or when proposed designations 
might have implications for cemp sites. This provision provides for a relatively 
strong model of cooperation as it prevents the atcm from acting without the 
agreement of the Commission and it has been held up as “an example of best 
practice that could usefully be adopted in other regions.”115 Not only is this pro-
cedure valuable for ensuring discussion prior to the establishment of an mpa, 
but effective engagement under this procedure permits coordination to be 
built into the ongoing management of protected sites by the inclusion of spe-
cific provisions within a management plan that foresee an ongoing role for the 
Commission in the management of the area. For example, the Management 
Plan for the Admiralty Bay amsa expressly provides that “harvesting of marine 
living resources should be conducted … with due recognition of the important 
scientific and environmental values of the Area [and] all those planning to 
conduct marine commercial harvesting in the Area should first submit their 
proposal to ccamlr” which must give its “prior approval.”116 This provision 
thus directly engages the Commission in fisheries related aspects of the asma. 
The Commission has also agreed that “each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
their fishing vessels … are aware of the location and relevant management plan 
of all designated aspa s and asma s which include marine areas…”117 thus rein-
forcing the integration of these two regimes.
It is also worth noting that Annex v doesn’t just give the Commission a role 
in approving aspa s and asma s proposed within the cep, but the Commission 
may itself propose such areas.118 This power could provide an important tool 
for promoting a joined up approach to mpa s under both treaty regimes, but it 
does not yet appear to have been used, highlighting a gap between the legal 
powers available on paper and the actual practice of the parties.
Similar coordination mechanisms are also found in the procedures for desig-
nating mpa s under ccamlr. Firstly, the procedure for developing management 
plans for cemp sites makes it clear that any such measures should be coordi-
nated with the atcm, who are formally notified of any proposal for a cemp 
115 Scott, supra note 56, at 129. See however the comments in N. B. Gardiner, Marine protected 
areas in the Southern Ocean: Is the Antarctic Treaty System ready to co-exist with a new 
United Nations instrument for areas beyond national jurisdiction?’, 122 Marine Policy 104212 
(2020), at 4: “This provision has resulted in a power shift to ccamlr Members, removing 
agency from the atcm in leading its own innovative marine protection initiatives.”
116 Management Plan for Antarctic Specially Managed Area No. 1, section 7(v).
117 ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-02 (2012).
118 Protocol, Annex v, Article 5(1).
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management plan. Whilst the procedure does not demand the prior approval 
of the atcm, it does provide that if an objection is received, “the Commission 
may institute such consultations as it may deem appropriate to achieve 
the necessary protection and to avoid interference with the achievement of the 
principles and purposes of, and measures adopted under, the Antarctic Treaty 
and other components of the Antarctic Treaty System which are in force.”119 
This indicates a clear desire for a coordinated outcome, even if it is expressed 
in discretionary language. When it comes to the designation of mpa s under 
the General Framework adopted by ccamlr, there is no express obligation 
to engage with the atcm during the designation phase, rather the focus is 
on sharing “information on conservation measures establishing mpa s in the 
Convention Area”120 following designation and then “endeavour[ing] to iden-
tify which actions by other elements of the Antarctic Treaty System … should 
be pursued to support the specific objectives of the mpa once established.”121 
This may lead to supporting measures taken by the atcm122, although comple-
mentary measures have not always been forthcoming.123 For example, when 
the South Shetland Islands mpa was adopted in 2009, the United Kingdom and 
Belgium proposed that the atcm adopt complementary conservation mea-
sures within the mpa, including a prohibition of all dumping and discharges by 
all non-fishing vessels within the mpa.124 Although some Consultative Parties 
were supportive, several objections were made, in part relating to the need 
to obtain advice from cep before taking conservation measures125, but also 
more broadly about the ability of the atcm to adopt area-based measures out-
with the procedures outlined in Annex v of the Protocol.126 One option would 
be the establishment of new aspa s/asma s in areas near, within or adjacent to 
ccamlr mpa s in order to offer complementary protection127, but it has been 
119 ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-01 (2004), at para. 8.
120 Ibid., at para. 9.
121 ccamlr Conservation Measure 91-04 (2011), at paras. 9–10.
122 See e.g. atcm Resolution 5 (2017), at para. 3.
123 Some consultative parties have expressed frustration on this front, whilst others have 
argued that the atcm cannot be expected to take action until mpa research and moni-
toring plans have been adopted by the Commission; see discussion in atcm xlii Report 
(2019), at paras. 74–78.
124 See United Kingdom/Belgium, Complementary Protection for Marine Protected Areas 
Designated by CCAMLR, atcm Document wp 44rev.1 (2010).
125 atcm xxxiii Report (2010), at paras. 46 and 49.
126 atcm xxxiii Report (2010), at para. 50.
127 See New Zealand, Harmonisation of Marine Protection Initiatives across the Antarctic 
Treaty System, atcm Document wp 48 (2019), at 4. Alternatively, it could involve amend-
ment of existing aspa/amsa management plans; ibid.
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emphasised in atcm discussions that “protected area designations should be 
based on sound science and that any decisions by ccamlr should not auto-
matically require complementary actions on the part of the Parties, but that 
the need for action would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.”128 
These observations underline how differences in the mandate and member-
ship of institutions can lead to tensions in practice, despite the shared objec-
tives that are pursued by these different regimes and the express provision for 
cooperation in the legal instruments.
Overall, despite some acknowledgement of the need for cooperation and 
integration of mpa s adopted under each treaty, there is a sense that mpa s in 
the Southern Ocean have not been developed in an integrated and systematic 
manner. The First Performance Review of the Commission in 2008 called for 
“closer integration and understanding between these respective bodies so as to 
ensure a mutual understanding of their objectives, the appropriate application 
of management mechanisms, as well as adequate (and more efficient) data 
and information sharing.”129 Some progress has been made since the first per-
formance review, particularly through joint meetings between the Scientific 
Committee and cep, including on the question of mpa s.130 Whilst better shar-
ing of scientific information is a vital part of integrated management, it is also 
important that the political bodies under the various pillars of the Antarctic 
Treaty System coordinate their work. In this respect, the Report of the Second 
ccamlr Performance Review in 2017 noted that “enhanced communication 
and collaboration at the level of the Commission and the atcm would also 
be beneficial”131 and it recommended “holding joint periodic meetings of 
ccamlr and atcm delegates – at a working level – to identify opportunities 
for coordination and cooperation on matters of mutual interest.”132 In this 
vein, some Members of the Commission have “encouraged ongoing work and 
discussion with the atcm and cep on [aspa s and asma s], including identi-
fying links to and harmonising, as relevant, the management plans of man-
aged or protected areas that occur within ccamlr mpa s, with the provisions 
of the Research and Monitoring Plans of those mpa s.”133 Similarly, a 2019 Joint 
Meeting of the cep and the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research called 
for integration between aspa s under the Environmental Protocol “with other 
tools available under the Environmental Protocol and other Antarctic Treaty 
128 atcm xl Report (2017), at para. 62.
129 CCAMLR Performance Review Panel Report (1 September 2008), at para. 7.
130 A joint workshop on mpa s was held in 2009.
131 Second Performance Review of CCAMLR – Final Report of the Panel (2017), at para. 27.
132 Ibid., at 4.
133 ccamlr 38 Report (2019), at para. 6.4.
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System instruments.”134 One delegation particularly called for “a ‘planned 
and integrated’ … protected areas system which works across both the cep and 
ccamlr, and involves consortium groups of proponents across regional plan-
ning areas, covering the full range of marine and terrestrial areas.”135
Joint meetings between different institutions, as proposed above, would 
allow an opportunity for direct discussions between relevant actors in a 
framework that did not prioritise the values of any single regime. Indeed, the 
concept of a joint meeting may not only provide focussed discursive space 
to explore mutually acceptable approaches to mpa s, but it could also lead to 
formal agreement upon shared frameworks for action, common guidelines or 
other joint instruments. In this context, it has been suggested that “the next 
stage in developing Southern Ocean mpa s is the joint designation of mpa s by 
ccamlr and the atcm.”136 This would be a major step-change for practice in 
the region, but one that is both desirable and feasible.
There are examples from other areas of international law where interna-
tional institutions have worked collaboratively not only to exchange infor-
mation and adopt complementary actions, but to proactively develop joint 
instruments which form an integral part of all relevant regimes.137 A good illus-
tration is the negotiation and adoption of the Guidelines on Fair Treatment 
of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident by a Joint ilo/imo Ad Hoc 
Expert Working Group and their subsequent adoption by the imo138 and the 
ilo.139 The convening of a Joint Working Group is based upon an express power 
in the Agreement between the International Maritime Organisation and the 
International Labour Organisation which provides for “any questions of com-
mon interest” to be referred to a joint committee composed of “representatives 
appointed by each organisation.”140 The direct involvement of delegations 
in these joint meetings, rather than just representatives of the secretariats, 
134 Co-convenors’ Report of the Joint scar/cep Workshop on Further Developing the 
Antarctic Protected Area System (2019), at 5.
135 See Background Paper submitted by the United Kingdom to the Joint scar/cep Workshop 
on Further Developing the Antarctic Protected Area System (2019). See also iucn, Marine 
Spatial Protection and Management under the Antarctic Treaty System: new opportunities 
for implementation and coordination, atcm Document ip 56 (2011), at 9.
136 Scott, supra note 56, at 135.
137 For a general discussion of such horizontal cooperation, see Harrison, supra note 9, at 
259–268.
138 See imo Legal Committee Resolution leg.3(91) (2006).
139 See Minutes of the 296th Session of the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Organisation, Document gb.296/pv (2006), at para. 80.
140 Agreement between the International Maritime Organisation and the International 
Labour Organisation, Article 3.
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means that they allow more than simply exchange of information about what 
each organisation is doing, but rather discussion about policy coordination. 
At the same time, the joint committee does not circumvent the institutional 
responsibilities of each organisation as it must report back to the appropriate 
bodies for formal confirmation of its work and any necessary action. In the 
case of the Joint Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a 
Maritime Accident, both institutions have kept this topic on the agenda since 
their adoption, with a view to monitoring developments and the possibility to 
reconvene the Joint Working Group remains an option for further collabora-
tive action.141 This demonstrates that coordination can be approached as an 
ongoing process. Arguably, there are lessons that could be learned from such 
practices with a view to strengthening cooperation between the bodies within 
the Antarctic Treaty System to promote stronger coordination between the rel-
evant institutions.
4 Towards Broader Cooperation and Coordination with Other 
Relevant Organisations
Whilst stronger intra-regional cooperation and coordination provides an 
important starting point for the integrated management of marine ecosys-
tems, it does not necessarily ensure that mpa s are protected from all threats by 
all actors. Indeed, the work of the regional institutions overlaps with a number 
of other global and regional bodies, such as the International Maritime Organ-
isation, the International Whaling Commission,142 the International Seabed 
Authority, other relevant regional fisheries management organisations,143 and 
conservation treaty bodies.144
The need for broader engagement with other international organisations 
is recognised within the Antarctic Treaty System, with both the Antarctic 
Treaty and ccamlr calling for the establishment of “co-operative working 
141 See e.g. imo Assembly Resolution A.1056(27) (2012).
142 The International Whaling Commission has established a whaling sanctuary in the 
Southern Ocean.
143 The Commission has memoranda of understanding with the South Pacific Regional Fish-
eries Management Organisation, the Commission on the Conservation of Southern Blue-
fin Tuna, the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, and the South East Atlantic 
Fisheries Organisation; see https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/cooperation-others. 
See also ccamlr Resolution 10/xii (Resolution on harvesting of stocks occurring both 
within and outside the Convention Area).
144 E.g. 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species; 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species.
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relationships” with other inter-governmental organisations.145 This is an obli-
gation of conduct, which provides significant flexibility to design arrange-
ments to facilitate interactions between relevant bodies.
This section will focus on the relationship between the Antarctic Treaty 
System and the International Maritime Organisation, which is the UN special-
ised agency responsible for developing shipping regulations.146 Many vessels 
flying the flags of diverse nations navigate in the waters of the Southern Ocean. 
Whereas both the atcm147 and ccamlr148 have adopted their own measures 
to address pollution from ships operating in the Southern Ocean, these mea-
sures will not necessarily apply to all relevant vessels due to the limited mem-
bership of these institutions. The importance of the imo in the present context 
is therefore its global membership149 and its recognised competence in the 
regulation of shipping150, which allows it to develop shipping standards in 
a far more effective manner compared to a regional body such as the atcm 
or ccamlr.151 As explained by the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, 
“the imo is important for Antarctica because the Antarctic Treaty System is 
not able to regulate all vessels operating in Antarctic waters, and ships are the 
major source of transportation to and from Antarctica.”152 This has also been 
expressly recognised by the atcm in its work on Antarctic Shipping which has 
engaged with the imo “as a means of extending [the] applicability [of mea-
sures adopted by the atcm] to members of the imo that are not Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties.”153 At the same time, a transfer of decision-making 
to the imo means that a broader range of interests may be reflected in the 
decision-making procedures of that organisation, which are structured around a 
145 Antarctic Treaty, Article 3(2); ccamlr, Article 23(3).
146 See 1948 Convention on the International Maritime Organisation.
147 See Protocol, Annex 4.
148 ccamlr Conservation Measure 26-01(2019).
149 The imo has 174 Member States and 3 Associate Members.
150 See A. Chircop, ‘The International Maritime Organisation’, in D. R. Rothwell, et al (Eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, 416–438 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015). See also Harrison, supra note 9, at 154–199.
151 Indeed, Articles 94(5) and 211(2) of unclos recognise that generally accepted interna-
tional rules and standards adopted through the competent international organisation or 
diplomatic conference may become binding on all unclos parties, regardless of whether 
they are a party to the treaty containing the rule or standard.
152 See https://www.asoc.org/advocacy/antarctic-governance/international-maritime 
-organization.
153 atcm Decision 2 (1999).
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different set of objectives, thus laying the ground for potential tension between 
the institutions.154
There is no formal mou between either the atcm or the Commission 
and the imo. Nevertheless, in practice, there has been ad hoc engagement 
between the regional institutions responsible for the Southern Ocean and the 
imo since the early days of the Antarctic Treaty.155 For example, the atcm 
has encouraged cooperation between Antarctic Treaty Parties and the imo, 
as well as inviting the imo to attend sessions of the atcm as an observer.156 
The atcm has also expressly called for the imo to adopt specific measures 
to protect the Southern Ocean157, including special areas under Annexes i, 
ii and v of marpol and a prohibition on the use and carriage of heavy fuel 
oil by vessels operating in the Antarctic Treaty Area.158 More significant is the 
adoption of the Polar Code by the imo, which entered into force on 1 January 
2017 and introduces much broader protections for polar waters. Again, the 
atcm was actively involved in the process leading to the adoption of this 
instrument159 and it has encouraged “additional safety and environmental pro-
tection matters…”160 The formulation of a Ballast Water Regional Management 
Plan for Antarctica, which was developed by the atcm161, and subsequently 
adopted by the imo Marine Environment Protection Committee162 and the 
Commission163 is another clear example of coordination in this sector. Yet, suc-
cessful coordination cannot necessarily be taken for granted and it has been 
pointed out in imo discussions that “the activities of regional organizations in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction were a delicate matter since these organiza-
tions, with a restricted structure or membership, do not necessarily represent 
154 See Hey, supra note 13.
155 See M. Weber, Cooperation of the Antarctic Treaty System with the International Maritime 
Organisation and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, 2 The Polar 
Journal 372–390 (2012).
156 See Resolution 5 (2010) Co-ordination among Antarctic Treaty Parties on Antarctic pro-
posals under consideration at the imo.
157 See Recommendation xv-4 (1989).
158 atcm Decision 8 (2005). See imo Resolution mepc.189(60) adopted on 26 March 2010, 
amending Annex I of the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution by 
Ships by adding a new chapter including special requirements for the use or carriage of 
oils in the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
159 See e.g. Resolution 3 (1998); Decision 4 (2004); Resolution 8 (2009). For broader discus-
sion of the interactions between the atcm and the imo on the Polar Code and other 
relevant issues, see Weber, supra note 157, at 372–390.
160 atcm Resolution 3 (2014).
161 atcm Resolution 3 (2006).
162 imo Resolution mepc.163(56).
163 Commission Resolution 28/xxvii (2008).
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the interests of the international community as a whole and could lead to the 
establishment of measures being applied to States who are not members of 
these regional organizations.”164 It follows that successful engagement must 
involve engagement and persuasion, as the imo cannot be expected to simply 
rubber stamp proposals advanced by a regional organisation. In this respect, 
the significant scientific evidence and operational expertise developed by the 
various institutions operating within the Antarctic Treaty System can be put to 
particular use in order to inform discussions at the global level, whilst recog-
nising that the ultimate balancing of interests is the prerogative of the relevant 
imo organs.
Most of the cooperation between the regional institutions and the imo has 
related to shipping in general and there has been less focus on using tools avail-
able under imo instruments to further protection of mpa s in the Southern 
Ocean, even though the ccamlr General Framework expressly recognises 
the International Maritime Organisation as a key global actor which may 
be required to adopt measures to support the development of the ccamlr 
mpa network.165 Moreover, some aspa/asma management plans do call for 
measures to minimise the impacts of shipping on the protected areas, such 
as avoiding anchoring in marine components of scientific zones and areas 
of environmental monitoring166, areas to be avoided167, or mandatory vessel 
reporting when entering certain areas168, but such measures only apply to 
parties to the Antarctic Treaty and arguably to ccamlr parties by virtue of 
Article 5(2) of ccamlr.
One tool that may be useful in broadening the scope of such measures is the 
designation of Particularly Sensitive Seas Areas (pssa s) in accordance with 
imo Resolution A.982(24), which would also permit the adoption of associated 
protective measures, such as routeing measures, no anchoring zones, or areas 
to be avoided. pssa s only provide protection against specific threats posed by 
international shipping but they are a useful tool to achieve integrated manage-
ment when they are designated in conjunction with mpa s designated by other 
164 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 68th Session, imo 
Document mepc 68/21 (2015), at para. 10.27.
165 ccamlr Conservation Measure 91/04(2011), at para. 10.
166 Admiralty Bay Management Plan, section 7(i). See also Port Foster, Deception Island, 
South Shetland Islands aspa No 145 Management Plan, section 7(iv) “anchoring shall 
be avoided except in exceptional circumstances”; Terra Nova Bay, Ross Sea aspa No 161 
Management Plan, section 7(i): “anchoring is prohibited within the area.”
167 See e.g. the seasonal buffer zones around restricted areas under the Southwest Anvers 
Island and Palmer Basin asma No 7, section 7(i).
168 See Deception Island amsa No 4 Management Plan, section 9(ii).
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bodies.169 There are currently no pssa s on the high seas, but it is generally 
accepted that there is no impediment to the imo adopting a high seas mpa, 
provided that it had the support of Member States.170 Indeed, the designation 
of pssa s in the Southern Ocean has been contemplated by states171 and the 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition has called for “a vulnerability assess-
ment of the potential impacts to Antarctic waters from vessels … to deter-
mine how to best to proceed to address any outstanding vulnerabilities.”172 
In particular, the pssa criteria could be usefully applied to those areas cov-
ered by existing mpas in the Southern Ocean, whether established under the 
Environmental Protocol or ccamlr, in order to determine whether the imo 
should take measures, such as navigational restrictions, to support the objec-
tives of these mpa s. Any state could in theory propose the designation of a 
pssa in the Southern Ocean173, although it would be stronger if the proposal 
came from the parties to ccamlr or the Antarctic Treaty collectively.174
5 Conclusions and Looking Forward
Whilst it is generally accepted that greater cooperation and coordination 
between international institutions is fundamental to the development of the 
law of the sea in general and the protection of the marine environment in par-
ticular, it has also been recognised that operationalising “cooperation at the 
practical level” is challenging.175 Indeed, despite the fact that “the relatively 
strong inter-institutional linkages in the [Antarctic Treaty System], the broad 
objectives of its instruments and the broad mandates of the [international 
169 J. Roberts, et al, Area-based Management on the High Seas: Possible Application of the 
IMO’s Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept, 25 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 483–522 (2010), at 498.
170 See e.g. R. Churchill, ‘High Seas Marine Protected Areas: Implications for Shipping’, in 
R. Caddell and R. Thomas (Eds.), Shipping, Law and the Marine Environment in the 
21st Century, 53–88 (Lawtext Publishing, Witney, 2013), at 73.
171 See e.g. Chairs Report – Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the Management of 
Ship-borne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area (2010), at para. 75. See also Scott, supra 
note 56, at 136.
172 Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Managing Antarctic Vessels – Avoiding Future 
Disasters, Document atcm xxxii ip 34 (2009), at 7.
173 See Roberts, et al, supra note 169, at 506.
174 See D. Freestone and V. Harris, ‘Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas beyond National Jurisdic-
tion: Time to Chart a New Course?’, in M. H. Nordquist, et al (Eds.), International Marine 
Economy: Law and Policy, 322–361 (Brill, Leiden, 2017), at 352.
175 See atcm Resolution 1(2006).
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organisations]operating under them are particularly conducive to integrated 
(cross-sectoral) ecosystem management”176, the interaction between these 
treaty regimes in practice reveals that integration is more challenging than an 
exclusive focus on the legal framework might suggest.
It is important to recognise that there has been progress in designating mpa s 
in the Southern Ocean, even if further steps are required. Indeed, there are 
potentially important lessons from this region for designing successful regime 
interaction between institutions in other regions. In particular, one can point to 
the early engagement between institutions in the designation of mpa s and the 
design of management plans in order to ensure that different interests and 
mandates are integrated. Moreover, such interactions between the atcm and 
the Commission are automatic where there is an overlap between the two 
regimes and this form of coordination should be encouraged in other regions.
The challenge of effectively protecting biodiversity beyond national juris-
diction from multiple threats has been acknowledged by the international 
community and negotiations are currently underway for a new internation-
ally legally binding instrument to promote the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.177 mpa s are 
a key theme of these negotiations, with the objective of enhancing coopera-
tion and coordination in the use of mpa s and other area-based measures. The 
mandate of the conference is designed to ensure that the result “should not 
undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant 
global, regional and sectoral bodies.”178 Thus, existing regional bodies are likely 
to still have an important role to play in any future regime on this subject, 
albeit potentially subject to scrutiny by a global body charged with overseeing 
the implementation of the new agreement.179 At the time of writing, the draft 
text of the proposed internationally legally binding instrument includes a pro-
vision requiring states to “make arrangements for consultation and coordina-
tion to enhance cooperation with and among relevant legal instruments and 
frameworks and relevant global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies with 
regard to area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, 
as well as coordination among associated conservation and [management] 
176 E. J. Molenaar, Managing Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, 22 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 89–124 (2007), at 95.
177 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/249 (24 December 2017).
178 Ibid., at para. 7.
179 See K. Dalaker Kraabel, ‘The BBNJ PrepCom and Institutional Arrangements: The Hype 
about the Hybrid Approach’, in M. H. Nordquist, et al (Eds.), The Marine Environment and 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14: Life below water, 137–172 (Brill, Leiden, 
2019).
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[sustainable use] measures adopted under such instruments and frameworks 
and by such bodies.”180 This provision would appear to call for the develop-
ment of the types of collaborative arrangements that have been discussed in 
this article. Such an obligation would be a welcome development, but it is not 
enough, as it does not account for the political challenges of cooperation or 
the progressive nature of collaborative activities.
In this respect, an analysis of how the mpa network in the Southern Ocean 
operates in practice also “provide[s] valuable insight into the environmen-
tal and political complexities of designating mpa s in [areas beyond national 
jurisdiction].”181 The experience of cooperation and coordination in this 
region underlines that regime interaction is not just a matter of legal linkages, 
although this is an important element, but it is also characterised by the inter-
play of the interests and values of the various actors involved in the regimes. 
Several powers that are available to promote cooperation and coordination 
under the relevant treaties have not been used in practice, in part due to ongo-
ing political disagreements underpinning these legal regimes. It is therefore 
important to recognise that cooperation and coordination is an ongoing activ-
ity and there is a need for institutions to build up mutual trust and shared 
understanding over time.182 It follows that the nature of the arrangements 
for cooperation and coordination may themselves need to evolve. In terms 
of thinking about how the international legal framework could be developed 
in order to better promote cooperation and coordination between existing 
institutions, it is arguably not sufficient to simply require a mechanism to be 
set up, but such mechanisms must also be periodically reviewed, preferably 
involving independent and external expertise, in order to assess how coordina-
tion arrangements are operating in practice and what improvements could be 
made. There is evidence from other contexts that such review mechanisms can 
have a positive influence on the development of institutional arrangements in 
order to improve their effectiveness.183 In the present context, a review process 
could provide an opportunity to draw upon best practices in inter-institutional 
180 Revised draft text of an Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, Document A/conf.232/2020/3 (18 November 2019), 
Article 15(3).
181 Gardiner, supra note 115, at 6.
182 See e.g. D. Johnson, ‘Can competent authorities cooperate for the common good: 
Towards a collective arrangement in the North-East Atlantic’, in P. A. Beckman and A. N. 
Vylegzhanin (Eds.), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean, 333–343 (Springer, Berlin, 
2013), at 341.
183 See B. Haas, et al, The Influence of Performance Reviews on Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations, 76 ices Journal of Marine Science 2082–2089 (2019).
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coordination, as well as a means for encouraging further experimentation in 
innovative inter-institutional coordination, for example through joint meet-
ings and potentially the development of joint instruments, which could lead 
to stronger and more coherent regional mpa networks. It would therefore be 
helpful if a new international legally binding instrument on the conservation 
of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction included an obli-
gation to carry out periodic reviews of any arrangements for consultation and 
coordination in order to facilitate this process, without necessarily dictating 
the outcome.184
184 For an example of the legalisation of institutional review processes, see e.g. 2012 Conven-
tion on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the North 
Pacific Ocean, Article 22.
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